Clarify and correct -z

diff --git a/path.c b/path.c
index 42898e0fb129d2d2219ab24a043510775beb8b5c..c7679be5c8727c7d374338f3ed047d8a5ec25c3c 100644 (file)
--- a/path.c
+++ b/path.c
@@ -139,6 +139,22 @@ int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
        return mkstemp(path);
 }
 
+/* git_mkstemps() - create tmp file with suffix honoring TMPDIR variable. */
+int git_mkstemps(char *path, size_t len, const char *template, int suffix_len)
+{
+       const char *tmp;
+       size_t n;
+
+       tmp = getenv("TMPDIR");
+       if (!tmp)
+               tmp = "/tmp";
+       n = snprintf(path, len, "%s/%s", tmp, template);
+       if (len <= n) {
+               errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+               return -1;
+       }
+       return mkstemps(path, suffix_len);
+}
 
 int validate_headref(const char *path)
 {
@@ -311,16 +327,23 @@ char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
        return NULL;
 }
 
-int adjust_shared_perm(const char *path)
+int set_shared_perm(const char *path, int mode)
 {
        struct stat st;
-       int mode, tweak, shared;
+       int tweak, shared, orig_mode;
 
-       if (!shared_repository)
+       if (!shared_repository) {
+               if (mode)
+                       return chmod(path, mode & ~S_IFMT);
                return 0;
-       if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
-               return -1;
-       mode = st.st_mode;
+       }
+       if (!mode) {
+               if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
+                       return -1;
+               mode = st.st_mode;
+               orig_mode = mode;
+       } else
+               orig_mode = 0;
        if (shared_repository < 0)
                shared = -shared_repository;
        else
@@ -344,9 +367,9 @@ int adjust_shared_perm(const char *path)
        }
 
        if (((shared_repository < 0
-             ? (st.st_mode & (FORCE_DIR_SET_GID | 0777))
-             : (st.st_mode & mode)) != mode) &&
-           chmod(path, mode) < 0)
+             ? (orig_mode & (FORCE_DIR_SET_GID | 0777))
+             : (orig_mode & mode)) != mode) &&
+           chmod(path, (mode & ~S_IFMT)) < 0)
                return -2;
        return 0;
 }
@@ -541,3 +564,50 @@ char *strip_path_suffix(const char *path, const char *suffix)
                return NULL;
        return xstrndup(path, chomp_trailing_dir_sep(path, path_len));
 }
+
+int daemon_avoid_alias(const char *p)
+{
+       int sl, ndot;
+
+       /*
+        * This resurrects the belts and suspenders paranoia check by HPA
+        * done in <435560F7.4080006@zytor.com> thread, now enter_repo()
+        * does not do getcwd() based path canonicalizations.
+        *
+        * sl becomes true immediately after seeing '/' and continues to
+        * be true as long as dots continue after that without intervening
+        * non-dot character.
+        */
+       if (!p || (*p != '/' && *p != '~'))
+               return -1;
+       sl = 1; ndot = 0;
+       p++;
+
+       while (1) {
+               char ch = *p++;
+               if (sl) {
+                       if (ch == '.')
+                               ndot++;
+                       else if (ch == '/') {
+                               if (ndot < 3)
+                                       /* reject //, /./ and /../ */
+                                       return -1;
+                               ndot = 0;
+                       }
+                       else if (ch == 0) {
+                               if (0 < ndot && ndot < 3)
+                                       /* reject /.$ and /..$ */
+                                       return -1;
+                               return 0;
+                       }
+                       else
+                               sl = ndot = 0;
+               }
+               else if (ch == 0)
+                       return 0;
+               else if (ch == '/') {
+                       sl = 1;
+                       ndot = 0;
+               }
+       }
+}