apply: do not touch a file beyond a symbolic link

Because Git tracks symbolic links as symbolic links, a path that
has a symbolic link in its leading part (e.g. path/to/dir/file,
where path/to/dir is a symbolic link to somewhere else, be it
inside or outside the working tree) can never appear in a patch
that validly applies, unless the same patch first removes the
symbolic link to allow a directory to be created there.

Detect and reject such a patch.

Things to note:

- Unfortunately, we cannot reuse the has_symlink_leading_path()
from dir.c, as that is only about the working tree, but "git
apply" can be told to apply the patch only to the index or to
both the index and to the working tree.

- We cannot directly use has_symlink_leading_path() even when we
are applying only to the working tree, as an early patch of a
valid input may remove a symbolic link path/to/dir and then a
later patch of the input may create a path path/to/dir/file, but
"git apply" first checks the input without touching either the
index or the working tree.  The leading symbolic link check must
be done on the interim result we compute in-core (i.e. after the
first patch, there is no path/to/dir symbolic link and it is
perfectly valid to create path/to/dir/file).

Similarly, when an input creates a symbolic link path/to/dir and
then creates a file path/to/dir/file, we need to flag it as an
error without actually creating path/to/dir symbolic link in the
filesystem.

Instead, for any patch in the input that leaves a path (i.e. a non
deletion) in the result, we check all leading paths against the
resulting tree that the patch would create by inspecting all the
patches in the input and then the target of patch application
(either the index or the working tree).

This way, we catch a mischief or a mistake to add a symbolic link
path/to/dir and a file path/to/dir/file at the same time, while
allowing a valid patch that removes a symbolic link path/to/dir and
then adds a file path/to/dir/file.

Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

diff --git a/builtin/apply.c b/builtin/apply.c
index 422e4ce7aada87216f6ce0f69754e527d6583cca..c2c6fda08c561f0b1b72aae7b252bc50ed211ae9 100644 (file)
--- a/builtin/apply.c
+++ b/builtin/apply.c
@@ -3486,6 +3486,104 @@ static int check_to_create(const char *new_name, int ok_if_exists)
        return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * We need to keep track of how symlinks in the preimage are
+ * manipulated by the patches.  A patch to add a/b/c where a/b
+ * is a symlink should not be allowed to affect the directory
+ * the symlink points at, but if the same patch removes a/b,
+ * it is perfectly fine, as the patch removes a/b to make room
+ * to create a directory a/b so that a/b/c can be created.
+ */
+static struct string_list symlink_changes;
+#define SYMLINK_GOES_AWAY 01
+#define SYMLINK_IN_RESULT 02
+
+static uintptr_t register_symlink_changes(const char *path, uintptr_t what)
+{
+       struct string_list_item *ent;
+
+       ent = string_list_lookup(&symlink_changes, path);
+       if (!ent) {
+               ent = string_list_insert(&symlink_changes, path);
+               ent->util = (void *)0;
+       }
+       ent->util = (void *)(what | ((uintptr_t)ent->util));
+       return (uintptr_t)ent->util;
+}
+
+static uintptr_t check_symlink_changes(const char *path)
+{
+       struct string_list_item *ent;
+
+       ent = string_list_lookup(&symlink_changes, path);
+       if (!ent)
+               return 0;
+       return (uintptr_t)ent->util;
+}
+
+static void prepare_symlink_changes(struct patch *patch)
+{
+       for ( ; patch; patch = patch->next) {
+               if ((patch->old_name && S_ISLNK(patch->old_mode)) &&
+                   (patch->is_rename || patch->is_delete))
+                       /* the symlink at patch->old_name is removed */
+                       register_symlink_changes(patch->old_name, SYMLINK_GOES_AWAY);
+
+               if (patch->new_name && S_ISLNK(patch->new_mode))
+                       /* the symlink at patch->new_name is created or remains */
+                       register_symlink_changes(patch->new_name, SYMLINK_IN_RESULT);
+       }
+}
+
+static int path_is_beyond_symlink_1(struct strbuf *name)
+{
+       do {
+               unsigned int change;
+
+               while (--name->len && name->buf[name->len] != '/')
+                       ; /* scan backwards */
+               if (!name->len)
+                       break;
+               name->buf[name->len] = '\0';
+               change = check_symlink_changes(name->buf);
+               if (change & SYMLINK_IN_RESULT)
+                       return 1;
+               if (change & SYMLINK_GOES_AWAY)
+                       /*
+                        * This cannot be "return 0", because we may
+                        * see a new one created at a higher level.
+                        */
+                       continue;
+
+               /* otherwise, check the preimage */
+               if (check_index) {
+                       struct cache_entry *ce;
+
+                       ce = cache_file_exists(name->buf, name->len, ignore_case);
+                       if (ce && S_ISLNK(ce->ce_mode))
+                               return 1;
+               } else {
+                       struct stat st;
+                       if (!lstat(name->buf, &st) && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
+                               return 1;
+               }
+       } while (1);
+       return 0;
+}
+
+static int path_is_beyond_symlink(const char *name_)
+{
+       int ret;
+       struct strbuf name = STRBUF_INIT;
+
+       assert(*name_ != '\0');
+       strbuf_addstr(&name, name_);
+       ret = path_is_beyond_symlink_1(&name);
+       strbuf_release(&name);
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
 static void die_on_unsafe_path(struct patch *patch)
 {
        const char *old_name = NULL;
@@ -3593,6 +3691,19 @@ static int check_patch(struct patch *patch)
        if (!unsafe_paths)
                die_on_unsafe_path(patch);
 
+       /*
+        * An attempt to read from or delete a path that is beyond a
+        * symbolic link will be prevented by load_patch_target() that
+        * is called at the beginning of apply_data() so we do not
+        * have to worry about a patch marked with "is_delete" bit
+        * here.  We however need to make sure that the patch result
+        * is not deposited to a path that is beyond a symbolic link
+        * here.
+        */
+       if (!patch->is_delete && path_is_beyond_symlink(patch->new_name))
+               return error(_("affected file '%s' is beyond a symbolic link"),
+                            patch->new_name);
+
        if (apply_data(patch, &st, ce) < 0)
                return error(_("%s: patch does not apply"), name);
        patch->rejected = 0;
@@ -3603,6 +3714,7 @@ static int check_patch_list(struct patch *patch)
 {
        int err = 0;
 
+       prepare_symlink_changes(patch);
        prepare_fn_table(patch);
        while (patch) {
                if (apply_verbosely)

diff --git a/t/t4122-apply-symlink-inside.sh b/t/t4122-apply-symlink-inside.sh
index 035c080581d5c10371e95d69d3219c619987c364..1779c0a5687c471b1e6d2e78a8509b9ca6c31307 100755 (executable)
--- a/t/t4122-apply-symlink-inside.sh
+++ b/t/t4122-apply-symlink-inside.sh
@@ -71,4 +71,91 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'do not read from beyond symbolic link' '
 
 '
 
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'do not follow symbolic link (setup)' '
+
+       rm -rf arch/i386/dir arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       git reset --hard &&
+       ln -s ../i386/dir arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       git add arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       git diff HEAD >add_symlink.patch &&
+       git reset --hard &&
+
+       mkdir arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       >arch/x86_64/dir/file &&
+       git add arch/x86_64/dir/file &&
+       git diff HEAD >add_file.patch &&
+       git diff -R HEAD >del_file.patch &&
+       git reset --hard &&
+       rm -fr arch/x86_64/dir &&
+
+       cat add_symlink.patch add_file.patch >patch &&
+       cat add_symlink.patch del_file.patch >tricky_del &&
+
+       mkdir arch/i386/dir
+'
+
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'do not follow symbolic link (same input)' '
+
+       # same input creates a confusing symbolic link
+       test_must_fail git apply patch 2>error-wt &&
+       test_i18ngrep "beyond a symbolic link" error-wt &&
+       test_path_is_missing arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       test_path_is_missing arch/i386/dir/file &&
+
+       test_must_fail git apply --index patch 2>error-ix &&
+       test_i18ngrep "beyond a symbolic link" error-ix &&
+       test_path_is_missing arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       test_path_is_missing arch/i386/dir/file &&
+       test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/i386/dir &&
+
+       test_must_fail git apply --cached patch 2>error-ct &&
+       test_i18ngrep "beyond a symbolic link" error-ct &&
+       test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/i386/dir &&
+
+       >arch/i386/dir/file &&
+       git add arch/i386/dir/file &&
+
+       test_must_fail git apply tricky_del &&
+       test_path_is_file arch/i386/dir/file &&
+
+       test_must_fail git apply --index tricky_del &&
+       test_path_is_file arch/i386/dir/file &&
+       test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/i386/dir &&
+
+       test_must_fail git apply --cached tricky_del &&
+       test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/i386/dir
+'
+
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'do not follow symbolic link (existing)' '
+
+       # existing symbolic link
+       git reset --hard &&
+       ln -s ../i386/dir arch/x86_64/dir &&
+       git add arch/x86_64/dir &&
+
+       test_must_fail git apply add_file.patch 2>error-wt-add &&
+       test_i18ngrep "beyond a symbolic link" error-wt-add &&
+       test_path_is_missing arch/i386/dir/file &&
+
+       mkdir arch/i386/dir &&
+       >arch/i386/dir/file &&
+       test_must_fail git apply del_file.patch 2>error-wt-del &&
+       test_i18ngrep "beyond a symbolic link" error-wt-del &&
+       test_path_is_file arch/i386/dir/file &&
+       rm arch/i386/dir/file &&
+
+       test_must_fail git apply --index add_file.patch 2>error-ix-add &&
+       test_i18ngrep "beyond a symbolic link" error-ix-add &&
+       test_path_is_missing arch/i386/dir/file &&
+       test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/i386/dir &&
+
+       test_must_fail git apply --cached add_file.patch 2>error-ct-file &&
+       test_i18ngrep "beyond a symbolic link" error-ct-file &&
+       test_must_fail git ls-files --error-unmatch arch/i386/dir
+'
+
 test_done

diff --git a/t/t4139-apply-escape.sh b/t/t4139-apply-escape.sh
index 02b97b3c3064cad341f9972184006084887d2607..45b5660a47d88f736aa777641084d13b45852969 100755 (executable)
--- a/t/t4139-apply-escape.sh
+++ b/t/t4139-apply-escape.sh
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ test_expect_success 'cannot delete file containing .. (index)' '
        test_path_is_file ../foo
 '
 
-test_expect_failure SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via ..' '
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via ..' '
        {
                mkpatch_symlink tmp .. &&
                mkpatch_add tmp/foo ../foo
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ test_expect_failure SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via ..' '
        test_path_is_missing ../foo
 '
 
-test_expect_failure SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via .. (index)' '
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via .. (index)' '
        {
                mkpatch_symlink tmp .. &&
                mkpatch_add tmp/foo ../foo
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ test_expect_failure SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via .. (index)' '
        test_path_is_missing ../foo
 '
 
-test_expect_failure SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via absolute path' '
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via absolute path' '
        {
                mkpatch_symlink tmp "$(pwd)" &&
                mkpatch_add tmp/foo ../foo
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ test_expect_failure SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via absolute path' '
        test_path_is_missing ../foo
 '
 
-test_expect_failure SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via absolute path (index)' '
+test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'symlink escape via absolute path (index)' '
        {
                mkpatch_symlink tmp "$(pwd)" &&
                mkpatch_add tmp/foo ../foo